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THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977:
A SOLUTION OR A PROBLEM?
The United States Congress began hearings in 1973 on the al-
leged use of "illicit" payments by American multinational corpora-
tions in foreign business transactions.' During the hearings
American multinational corporations voluntarily disclosed2 that
"illicit" payments had been used to obtain or retain foreign busi-
ness. 3 These "illicit" payments included bribes, kickbacks, political
contributions, and "grease" payments,4 with the principal recipients
being foreign officials.'
The public admission by American multinational corporations
of their widespread use of "illicit" payments created a national and
international controversy over the propriety of such practices.6 In
an attempt to resolve the controversy, the United States enacted the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA). 7 In addition, sev-
eral international organizations' voiced their disapproval of the use
of "illicit" payments by adopting a Code of Conduct,9 establishing
1. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE CONDUCT, THE IM-
PACT OF UNITED STATES LAWS ON EUROPEAN & UNITED STATES OPERATIONS 718 (1979).
2. The Securities and Exchange Commission initiated the investigations with the "vol-
untary compliance and disclosure program." See Hearings on the Activities ofAmerican Mul-
tinational Corporations Abroad Before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of
the House Committee on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 63-64, 66 (1975) [here-
inafter cited as Hearings on Activities & American Corporations].
3. J. KENNEDY & C.E. SIMON, AN EXAMINATION OF QUESTIONABLE PAYMENTS AND
PRACTICES 118 (1978).
4. See text accompanying notes 14-43 infra.
5. See generally Y. KUGEL & G.W. GRUENBERG, INTERNATIONAL PAYOFFS (1977).
6. The disclosure and corporate payments caused "the removal of a Central American
president, embarrassed a Philippine regime, led to a constitutional crisis in the Netherlands,
caused legislative paralysis in Japan, and, left a shaken Italian government. In the United
States, questions over the propriety of foreign payments recently delayed the confirmation of
the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board." McLaughlin, The Criminalization of Questiona-
ble Foreign Payments By Corporations.- A Comparative Legal Systems Analysis, 46 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1071 (1979); see also notes 7-11 infra.
7. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78q(b), 78dd, 78ff (West Supp. 1980).
8. See text accompanying notes 120-61 infra. These international organizations in-
clude the United Nations General Assembly, the Organization of American States, the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the International Chamber of
Commerce.
9. Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, adopted
June 21, 1976, Annex and Decisions of Council, OECD Doc. 21 (76) 04/1 (1976), 75 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 83 (1976), reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 967 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
1
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the Commission of Transnational Corporations' ° and developing a
draft text on the International Agreement on Illicit Payments."
American multinational corporations 12 protested the enact-
ment of the FCPA because of its alleged inconsistency with the
practical aspects of engaging in business transactions in countries
other than the United States. 13 This comment will examine the in-
consistent legal aspects of the FCPA, and contrast it with the laws
of foreign countries and international resolutions. This examina-
tion will reveal that the FCPA not only is inconsistent with the le-
gal practices of nations, but that it also disregards principles of
customary international law on illicit payments.
This comment will discuss the basic types of "illicit" payments
and analyze the reasons asserted for their use by multinational cor-
porations. Three approaches to prohibiting "illicit" payments will
then be examined: that of the United States, international organi-
zations, and foreign states. The United States approach, the FCPA,
will be analyzed to determine the scope and extent of the criminal-
ization of "illicit" payments. This approach will be contrasted with
the efforts of four international organizations: the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Organization of American
Declaration on International Investment]. Member countries of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
10. The U.N. Comission on Transnational Corporations, ECOSOC Res. 1721, 53 U.N.
ESCOR, Supp. (No. I), U.N. Doc E/5209 (1972) began as a request to the U.N. Secretary-
General to establish a Group of Eminent Persons to investigate the impact of multinational
corporations on world development. The report by the Group of Eminent Persons recom-
mended a Commission to develop a comprehensive program to deal with multinational cor-
porations. Report of the Group of Eminent Persons, The Impact of Multinational
Corporations on Development and on International Relations, U.N. Doc. E/5500/ Rev. 1,
ST/ESA/6, at 55 (1974). The committee is composed of forty-eight members, thirty-three
from Latin America, Africa and Asia, ten from Western European and "other states," and
five from Eastern bloc countries.
11. United Nations, Report of the Economic & Social Council Committee on an Inter-
national Agreement on Illicit Payments, U.N. Doc E/1979/104 (1979), reprinted in 19 INT'L
LEGAL' MATS. 1024 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Draft TextI.
12. See Butterfield, US Law Barring Bribes Blamedfor Millions in Lost Sales in Asia,
N.Y. Times, June 26, 1978, at 1, col. 5. See also J. KENNEDY & C.E. SIMON, supra note 3.
13. McLaughlin, supra note 6; Comment, Payments to Foreign Officials by Multinational
Corporations." Bribery or Business Expense and the Effects of U S. Policy, 6 CALIF. W. INT'L
L. J. 360 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Payments to Foreign Officials]; Lashbrooke, The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 A Unilateral Solution to an International Problem, 12 COR-
NELL INT'L L. J. 227, 229 (1979).
Vol. I I
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States (OAS) and the United Nation's draft text on the Agreement
on Illicit Payments. The criminal statutes of foreign states will then
be examined to demonstrate the legal inconsistency between the
United States and the rest of the world, and the United States' dis-
regard of customary international principles on illicit payments.
Finally, this Comment concludes that the inconsistent approach
taken by the United States government creates difficulties for itself,
for American multinational corporations, and for foreign states.
The revision of the FCPA to conform with customary international
principles is advised.
I. ILLICIT PAYMENTS
A. Types of Illicit Payments
Illicit payments encompass bribes, extortion, facilitating pay-
ments and, depending on the circumstances, political contributions
and kickbacks. " These payments and the circumstances that cause
acceptable payments to become illegal will be defined to demon-
strate the different types of payments and their legal construction.
The following analysis becomes important when attempting to un-
derstand state practice in proscribing illicit payments.
1. Bribes. Bribes are the most widely recognized of the "il-
licit" payments by reason of their universal classification as ille-
gal.' 5 A bribe is a payment voluntarily given by the payor' 6 to the
receiver or bribee who is paid to either deviate or abstain from per-
forming his duties, to perform an unlawful act, or to perform an act
that gives a competitive advantage to the briber.' 7
A recent investigation by Dutch authorities demonstrates how
a bribe may be used to create a competitive advantage for the
briber. The investigation disclosed that McDonnell-Douglas, an
American multinational corporation, made payments to the direc-
tor of KLM, Royal Dutch Airlines; t" McDonnell-Douglas subse-
quently received a $600 million order to furnish KLM with air-
planes.' 9 This one example is illustrative of the fact that when
corporations weigh the benefits of such practices against the poten-
14. N. JACOBY, P. NEHEMKIS, & R. ELLIS, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION IN WORLD BUSI-
NESS 89 (1977).
15. Y. KUGEL & G.W. GRUENBERG, supra note 5, at 11.
16. W.M. REISMAN, FOLDED LIES, BRIBERY, CRUSADES AND REFORMS 75 (1979).
17. Id.
18. Wall Street Journal, February 12, 1979, at 6, col. 4.
19. Id.
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tial criminal liabilities, sound business judgment often requires that
the payment be made.
2. Extortion Payments. An extortion payment is best defined
by contrasting it to a bribe. One distinctive feature of an extortion
payment is the use of threats by the extortionist to obtain some ben-
efit, whereas with a bribe the payment is voluntary.2" The receiver
of an extortion payment threatens to do harm to the payor, while
the receiver of a bribe acts improperly to benefit the payor.21 A
bribe is initiated by the payor, an extortion is initiated by the re-
ceiver.22
The above legal distinctions operate to shift the focus of guilt
from one party to the other.23 Since it is the briber who "corruptly"
induces another to act improperly, it is the briber who bears the
guilt. 24 However, extortion shifts the guilt to the receiver, or extor-
tionist.21 When the parties' roles merge so that it is difficult to dis-
cern when bribery ends and extortion begins, one party will bear
the penalties unless criminal codes provide that the payor and the
receiver share equal blame for their actions.
Extortion may take many forms. For example, an extortion
occurred when a South Korean political leader threatened to ob-
struct.Gulf Oil operations unless a four million dollar contribution
was made to his presidential election campaign.27 In another case
$215,000 was extorted by foreign government officials from the
Phelps Dodge Corporation to pass items through customs.
28 Simi-
larly, General Foods made extortion payments to customs officials
to clear goods wrongfully withheld at customs.
29
3. Facilitating Payments. The expression "facilitating" indi-
20. N. JACOBY, P. NEHEMKIS & R. ELLIS, supra note 14, at 90-91.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. In some instances it can also change what once was a bribe into an extortion
payment. For instance, in Italy, American oil companies made large political contributions
to secure benefits from the government. Later, when the government officials realized their
power over these companies, they forced the corporations to continue the payments. Wall
Street Journal, May 19, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
24. N. JACOBY, P. NEHEMKIS, & R. ELLIS, supra note 14, at 90-91.
25. Id.
26. Hearings on Political Contributions to Foreign Governments Before the Subcommittee
on Multinational Corporations ofthe Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. 167 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on Political Contributions].
27. Id.
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cates the payor intends that the receiver insure a smooth or acceler-
ated performance of a particular transaction.3" Facilitating
payments are routinely given to secure or accelerate performance
by one who is obligated to perform the services without the pay-
ment.3' Public officials, such as tax assessors, customs inspectors,
and immigration officials, without violating their occupational du-
ties will "take care of" or accelerate an assignment for a "tip."32
Typically, facilitating payments occur in situations where time is of
recognized economic value, performances are routine, and the
transaction is necessary in foreign governments.33 Many times the
corporation will establish million dollar accounts from which the
subsidiary can withdraw funds to pay government employees and
others "to expedite customs clearance."34 Other corporations will
pay a lump sum to the public official to "take care of' tax assess-
ments and inspections for a specified period of time.35
4. Kickbacks and Political Contributions. Although these two
types of payments are different, they are discussed together since
both kickbacks and political contributions may be legal under one
set of circumstances and illegal under another. Thus, it becomes
necessary to look to the facts and the applicable criminal statutes to
determine if the payment is legal or illegal.
Bonafide discounts or rebates are legal kickbacks where the
lowered price has been reached through a mutual agreement be-
tween the parties.36 As soon as the bargaining position tips in favor
of one party, the kickback is no longer considered a discount in
price, but rather a factor designed to influence the party with the
superior bargaining position.37 Frequently the party in the superior
bargaining position is the foreign official, since multinational cor-
porations are often competing with each other for business.
38
Political contributions to foreign officials are generally
designed to manipulate the political climate to the corporation's ad-
30. W.M. REISMAN, supra note 16, at 69-75.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 70-73 & 72 n.7.
33. Id.
34. Wall Street Journal, February 15, 1978, at 18, col. 3.
35. Id.
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vantage.39 One of the more flagrant examples was the funding by
International Telephone & Telegraph Company of the presidential
election in Chile to create an environment favorable to its business
interests.40 Indeed, several multinational oil corporations paid up
to forty-six million dollars to various foreign political parties.4
The potentially adverse effect of these contributions in politically
volatile countries has caused considerable tension between develop-
ing nations and multinational corporations. 42 Consequently, the le-
gality of political contributions has recently been reexamined.43
B. The History of Illicit Payments
Corruption44 among political leaders and business entities has
existed since the earliest records of mankind,45 and "illicit" pay-
ments have been used "in all periods of political development" 46 to
further economic opportunities in foreign lands.
Ancient Greece and Rome both experienced significant growth
in the use of "illicit" payments during their expansion of economic
activity to overseas provinces.47 Corruption persisted throughout
the Middle Ages as payments were extorted from peasants to satisfy
feudal barons.4 ' The exploration and colonization in the 1500's
was accompanied by blatant corruption in Peru, Mexico, and
India.4 9 During the 1800's illicit payments continued50 with the
39. Herlihy & Levine, Corporate Crisis.- The Overseas Payment Problem, 8 LAW & POL.
INT'L Bus. 547, 550-53 (1976).
40. REPORT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS BY THE SUBCOMMIT-
TEE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS. THE INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND TELE-
GRAPH COMPANY AND CHILE 1970-71, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970-71).
41. Larry Martz and others, Payoff: The Growing Scandal, NEWSWEEK 30 (February 23,
1976).
42. A. PINELO, THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AS A FORCE IN LATIN AMERICAN
POLITICS xii (1973).
43. This is evident by the recent prohibition of political contributions under the FCPA
as well as under the Code of Conduct. See text accompanying notes 133-39 infra.
44. In the United States "corrupt" has been defined as "an evil motive or purpose, an
intent to wrongfully influence the recipient." Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
Generally, it has been defined as acts of individuals who violate or diverge from accepted
normative standards or the laws. J.C. SCOTT, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL CORRUPTION 10
(1972).
45. Id. at 3; In the Code of Hammurabi, the King of Babylon proscribed bribes. See Y.
KUGEL & G.W. GRUENBERG, supra note 5, at 12.
46. M. HALAYYA, EMERGENCY WAR ON CORRUPTION 5 (1975).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 6.
49. Y. KUGEL & G.W. GRUENBERG, supra note 5, at 12.
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growth of businesses in the United States.5 ' Illicit payments grew
significantly in amount and quantity as corporations expanded in-
ternationally.52
C Reasons Assertedfor Using Illicit Payments
Today multinational corporations continue to use illicit pay-
ments in business transactions.53 One theory suggests that these
payments persist because the majority of countries transact business
through governmental officials,54 many of whom use their power
and authority to extract monies from the corporations.
55
Under this theory illicit payments are considered a necessary
and acceptable component of international business transactions.
5 6
The business marketplace renders the illicit payments necessary
because of the "fierce competition among Japanese, Western
European, and United States multinational corporations."57 Fur-
ther, illicit payments are deemed acceptable in foreign countries
where under-paid government officials 58 solicit monies to maintain
and provide for their "extended families."5 9
One author contends that illicit payments are prevalent in de-
veloping nations6° due to a traditional "gift-giving" practice which
obligates wealthy individuals to "make gifts to their poorer clien-
tele."61 In return, the "poorer clientele" must accommodate the
payor.62 Consequently, the author argues illicit payments will con-
51. Id. The Credit Mobilier Union Pacific Railroad scandal of 1872 exemplifies the use
of such payments to control business markets. In that scandal United States Congressman
Oakes Ames, in an effort to assist his brother who was president of Union Pacific Railroad,
offered bribes to other members of Congress for their assistance in pushing through federal
financing for Union Pacific's railroad construction.
52. See generally Hearings on Activities & American Corporations, supra note 2. Corpo-
rations, like Merck & Co. Inc., admitted making illicit payments to employees of more than
thirty foreign governments between 1968 and 1975.
53. N. JACOBY, P. NEHEMKIS, & R. ELLIS, supra note 14, at 4.
54. Payiments to Foreign Officials, supra note 14.
55. Id. at 364. The author contends that these foreign officals extract monies from cor-
porations "rather than from the country which the official represents."
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. The author maintains that government officials are "deliberately" paid low
wages which, in turn, compels the official to seek additional support from outside sources.
59. J.C. SCoTT, supra note 44, at 10.
60. Id.
61. 1d.
62. Id. at 3.
1981
7
Hamilton: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: A Solution or a Proble
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1981
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
tinue to exist irrespective of whether multinational corporations op-
erate within the country.
63
A third analysis suggests that multinational corporations use
illicit payments as a means of protection from arbitrary govern-
mental actions.64 For example, compared to the United States,65
Middle Eastern nations do not provide sufficient legal protection
for multinational corporations. 66 As a result, multinational corpo-
rations are forced to "pay for" their legal protection since vague
laws, constitutions, and judicial guidelines make alternative actions
unavailable.
In varying degrees these forces combine to influence the use of
illicit payments. In the United States alone, illicit payments in
commercial transactions are estimated at fifteen billion dollars an-
nually.67 In view of this fact, it may well be that illicit payments
occur whenever there is an economic incentive to deviate from legal
and ethical standards.
68
Corporations exist to make a profit. 69 They tend to view illicit
payments as necessary to maintaining "the[ir] continued or future
profitability."7 This is supported by the fact that most illicit pay-
ments by multinational corporations were made "predictably, in or-
der to induce or augment sales."'" Such payments include those to
impede the nationalization or expropriation of corporate assets, 72 to
maintain favorable business climates, 73 to reduce tax assessments,
74
63. McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 1074.
64. The author asserts that "the American model places definite limits on the exercise of
executive and legislative power by constitutional guarantees." Id. at 1019.
65. Id. at 1076-84. For example, the author points to the independence of the executive
branch from the legislative, the transfer of power under the guise of constitutional mandates,
and the limitations on the executive and legislative powers by constitutional guarantees as
examples of constraints imposed by the United States upon powerful officials.
66. Id. On the other hand, the author points out that in Islam the legislative and execu-
tive branch are one in the same, power is transferred in an ad hoc manner, and there are no
"legal" guarantees.
67. The Washington Post, June 1976, at 1, col. 1.
68. J.C. SCOTT, supra note 44, at 3.
69. This is generally thought to be the motivating factor behind corporate executives
who take part in the authorization of bribes. Deutsch, Defining the Future. Personal Influence
and United.States Corporate Law, 4 J. CORP. L. 87 (1978).
70. Herlihy & Levine, supra note 39, at 568.
71. J. KENNEDY & C.E. SIMON, supra note 3, at 118.
72. See Wall Street Journal, April 9, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
73. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
GULF OIL CORPORATION 218 (December 3, 1975) [hereinafter cited as GULF REPORT].
74. TIME, February 23, 1976, at 31.
Vol. I I
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and to prevent adverse legislation.75 This economic concern of cor-
porations causes them to deviate from the legal and ethical statu-
tory standards76 which either authorize or prohibit certain types of
payments.77
United States multinational corporations defended their use of
"illicit payments" in international business practices by asserting
they were both .customary and necessary.78 Governments and in-
ternational organizations rejected these arguments and renounced
the use of illicit payments.79 Beginning with the FCPA, the follow-
ing pages will examine the arguments and resulting proscription of
"illicit payments" by the United States, international organizations,
and foreign governments.
II. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Unlike prior law,80 the FCPA prohibits illicit payments to for-
eign officials, foreign political parties, and foreign political candi-
dates.8" A corporation violating the FCPA can incur a fine of up to
one million dollars.8 2 A violation by an individual acting on behalf
of the corporation may result in a ten thousand dollar fine, impris-
onment for up to five years, or both. 3
A. Liability of Persons
The FCPA narrowly defines the entities and persons affected
by its criminal sanctions. By excluding particular classes of per-
sons, the types of payments prohibited by the FCPA are, in effect,
also defined.
The FCPA prohibits any "officer, director, employee, agent, or
stockholder" of a corporation, as well as the corporation itself, from
offering, promising or making illicit payments to foreign officials.84
Criminal penalties apply only to the bribing party.85
75. Wall Street Journal, May 21, 1975, at 4, col. 2.
76. See generally Y. KUGEL & G.W. GRUENBERG, supra note 5; M. HALAYYA, supra
note 46, at 72.
77. J.C. SCOTT, supra note 44, at 4.
78. See Senate Hearings on Political Contributions, supra note 26, at 316.
79. See text accompanying notes 81-255 infra.
80. For a representative summary see PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note I.
81. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(a)(l)-(3), 78dd-2(a)(l)-(3) (West Supp. 1980).
82. Id. § 78ff(c).
83. Id. § 78dd-2(b).
84. Id. §§ 78dd-I(a)(l)-(3), 78dd-2(a)(l)-(3).
85. See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
9
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However, foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations
operating in and organized under the laws of a foreign state are
exempt under the FCPA.86 This exemption was designed to mini-
mize the problems of jurisdiction and the resulting uncertainty af-
fecting diplomatic relations.87 The exemption does not extend,
however, to the parent corporation which may have initiated illicit
payments through their foreign subsidiary,88 to foreign corpora-
tions required to register under section 12 of the "1934 Act,"8 9 or to
foreign corporations owned or controlled by United States citi-
zens.9" Thus, under the FCPA the United States has claimed a
right to interfere in foreign countries if a corporation is either incor-
porated or registered in the United States. 9'
A person making illicit payments to foreign officials subjects a
corporation to criminal liability if the person was acting on behalf
of the corporation and the corporation was either actually or im-
pliedly aware of the payments.92 The corporation's knowledge
would depend:
on all the facts and circumstances including the position of the
employee, the care with which the board of directors supervises
management, the care with which management supervises em-
ployees in sensitive positions and its adherence to the strict ac-
counting standards set forth under Section 102. The prohibitions
against corrupt payments apply in this regard to payments by
agents where the corporation paying them knew or had reason to
know they would be passed on in whole or in part to a foreign
government official for a proscribed purpose. Of course, where
the corporation knows the payment will be passed on for a pro-
86. The Conference Committee eliminated a House provision which would have made
foreign subsidiaries "controlled" by a United States corporation or domestic concern subject
to the Act. H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1977).
87. AD Hoc COMM. ON FOREIGN PAYMENTS, THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS BY CORPORATIONS
THE PROBLEM AND APPROACHES TO A SOLUTION 4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as AD Hoc
COMM. REPORT].
88. Id. As stated in the House Report, "the Conferees intend to make it clear that any
issuer or domestic concern which engages in bribery of foreign officials indirectly through




91. AD Hoc COMM. REPORT, supra note 87, at 4.
92. See Note, Accounting For Corporate Misconduct Abroad The Foreign Corrupt Prac-
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scribed purpose, the violation is complete.93
This test may limit the liability of multinational corporations.
However, the application of such a test may range from imposing
liability upon the corporation for unreasonable ignorance or acqui-
escence to the agents actions,94 to providing immunity from unau-
thorized acts where a multinational corporation has exercised
reasonable care to avoid illicit payments.95
Although the FCPA prohibits illicit payments to foreign offi-
cial "decisionmakers," 96 it does not prohibit illicit payments to
those "whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical." '97 This
exception is designed to limit the scope of payments that are con-
sidered illegal.98 However, the exception is not found in the defini-
tion of illicit payments, but in the definition of "foreign clerks." 99
Payments to foreign clerks, for whatever purpose and for whatever
amount are therefore permissible under the FCPA.' °
B. Kinds of Illegal Payments
Before a corporation is subject to criminal penalties for mak-
ing illicit payments, a corrupt intent must be proved by the prose-
cution.' 0  A corporation must induce the foreign official "to misuse
his official position to obtain, retain, or direct business" to the cor-
poration. 10 2 Should those elements be missing, a corporation can
make countless bribes, kickbacks, or facilitating payments.
A corrupt intent may be inferred from the size of the bribe,
past conduct of the corporation, and the duties of the foreign offi-
cial.'03 These factors, however, do not resolve whether "goodwill"
payments or "gifts" are considered illegal since there is a lack of the
requisite corrupt intent."0 Without a precise standard corporations
could evade the FCPA by distributing "gifts" in place of bribes,
93. Senate Report, supra note 44, at 10.
94. Best, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 11 REV. SEC. REG. 975, 980 (1978).
95. Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 A Transactional Analysis, 13 J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 367, 386 (1979) [hereinafter cited as The FCP.4.
96. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b)(2) (West Supp. 1980).
97. Id.
98. The FCP4, supra note 95, at 396.
99. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(d)(2) (West Supp. 1980).
100. Estey & Marston, Pitfalls and Loopholes in the Foreign Bribery Law, FORTUNE 188
(October 9, 1978).
101. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, UNLAWFUL CORPORATE
PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977, H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977).
102. Id.
103. See generally The FCP.4, supra note 95, at 386.
104. Accountingfor Corporate Misconduct, supra note 92, at 299-300.
11
Hamilton: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: A Solution or a Proble
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1981
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
thereby exploiting a loophole in the Act and hampering the en-
forcement of its criminal provisions. 10 5 In addition, corporations
may be handicapped in conducting business fearing that goodwill
payments will be construed as bribes.0 6
Bribes, kickbacks and political contributions are prohibited by
the FCPA, °7 while facilitating and extortion payments are not.' 0 8
The exemption of facilitating and extortion payments can be ex-
plained by examining the economic principles associated with the
different kinds of illicit payments.
Payments made to obtain business or influence legislation sug-
gest unfair competition and economic waste. 10 9 Large, prosperous
corporations which have funds available to improperly influence
foreign officials upset "our capacity to compete abroad" and un-
fairly effect "competition for export markets among our business
enterprises."''" Many times payments made to influence foreign
officials are ineffective and wasteful since the foreign official either
does not have the authority to bind the governmental agency''' or
the governmental agency has made previous commitments."
12
Facilitating and extortion payments, on the other hand, are
made to ensure performance of the official's job or prevent harm to
a corporation's business investments.' It is argued that corpora-
tions must be able to conduct business without continually fearing
delay or destruction of goods." 4 By permitting corporations to
make facilitating and extortion payments, the United States is, in
effect, attempting to protect businesses from arbitrary governmental
actions. '15
There is doubt, however, that the exemption of facilitating and
105. Id.
106. Estey & Marston, supra note 100.
107. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-I(a)-2(a) (West Supp. 1980).
108. Senate Report, supra note 44.
109. One author contends that "bribes may result in unfair competition and misalloca-
tion of resources by allowing less efficient firms to obtain business or by encouraging firms to
compete in the size of their bribes, rather than in the quality or cost of their products or
services." Chu & Magraw, The Deductability of Questionable Foreign Payments, 87 YALE L.
REV. 1091, 1096 (1978).
110. AD Hoc COMM. REPORT, supra note 87, at 4.
I1I. S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 110 (1978).
112. In Nigeria, several officials sought bribes before accepting contracts for cement. As
a result, the Nigerian government ordered five times more cement than it needed. New York
Times, Dec. 4, 1975, at 4, col. I.
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extortion payments alone will curb discretionary action by foreign
governments. 16 In fact, the main purpose for exempting such pay-
ments was not the fear of arbitrary governmental action, but rather
the apprehension by Congress that necessary evidence, witnesses,
and cooperation from foreign governments would be lacking."
7
The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
concluded that while "facilitating payments may be reprehensible,
it does not appear feasible for the United States to attempt to eradi-
cate all such payments.' 118
C. Summary of the FCRA
The United States has dealt with the problem of illicit pay-
ments through internal legislation. Nevertheless, the FCPA oper-
ates externally since criminal penalties are imposed only when
payments are made in a foreign country or to foreign officials." 9
By combining this with the FCPA's limited prohibition of certain
kinds of illicit payments, a dilemma is created for multinational
corporations when foreign countries impose differing proscriptions.
This conflict is created when the FCPA prohibits some payments
that are legal in foreign countries and excludes payments from the
FCPA which are illegal in foreign countries.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH
Initially, international organizations scrutinized multinational
corporations because of their domination of capital and resources
on a worldwide scale. 20 Their concern escalated during the 1970's
when American multinational corporations disclosed significant
payments made to government officials to retain or gain control
over resources. 12' International organizations were quick to re-
spond to the problems created by illicit payments. Within a span of
fifteen months the United Nations, the OECD, the OAS and the
ICC, through the issuance of declarations, establishment of com-
mittees, and formulation of guidelines for multinational corpora-
116. See McLaughlin, supra note 6.
117. Note, Prohibitng Foreign Bribes. Criminal Sanctions For Corporate Payments
Abroad, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 231, 247 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Bribes].
118. Senate Report, supra note 44, at 3 (1977).
119. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-1-2 (West Supp. 1980).
120. Gabriel, Management of Public Interests by Multinational Corporations, J. WORLD
TRADE L. 15, 19-21 (1977).
121. Id.
13
Hamilton: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: A Solution or a Proble
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1981
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
tions have attempted to create an international attitude conducive
to the elimination of illicit payments.
A. United Nations General Assembly
The United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution di-
recting governments to take legal action against "multinational and
other corporations" as well as subsidiaries "and others in-
volved." 122 The broad language of the resolution indicates that the
members favored laws that would punish all parties involved in
making the illicit payments. 23 This would include both interna-
tional and domestic corporations, 24 the briber, 125 and the bribee.126
B. The Organization of American States
The second international organization to address the issue of
illicit payments was the OAS, an organization predominantely
composed of developing countries. 27 On July 10, 1975, the OAS
unanimously accepted a resolution condemning "any act of brib-
ery, illegal payment, or other offer by a multinational corporation."
In addition, it condemned any "demand for or acceptance of im-
proper payments" by an official or private person.'
28
Both the OAS and U.N. resolutions advise governments to
prohibit illicit payments.' 29 Furthermore, these sanctions are di-
rected at both the briber and the bribee.1
30
One difference between the two resolutions is the motive of the
OAS in condemning illicit payment. The OAS resolution de-
nounced multinational corporations' manipulation of developing
countries through illicit payments'' by recognizing "[t]hat such il-
legal activities have an adverse effect on the political and economic






127. OAS CP/Res No. 154 (167/75), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1326-28, 1603
(1975).
128. Id.
129. Id. See text accompanying notes 122-23 supra.
130. Id. See text accompanying notes 124-26 supra.
131. Id. Thus, the OAS approach does not provide the same protection to multinational
corporations as the approaches of the OECD, the U.N. resolution and the ICC. See Note,
Legislating Business Morality A Look At Efforts By Two International Organizations to Deal
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relations between member states."'' 32
C The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) established a committee to draft a code of conduct
for multinational corporations in January 1975.13 3 A year and a
half later the OECD became the first international organization to
formulate and adopt guidelines for multinational corporations.
34
The general policies of the guidelines state that multinational cor-
porations should not give nor should they be requested to give
bribes and other "improper benefits."' 135 Political contributions,
unless legally permissible, should not be rendered. 36  Similarly,
multinational corporations should refrain from "improper political
activities."'' 37 The Code of Conduct echoes the OAS and United
Nations' call for voluntary compliance by multinational corpora-
tions ' 38 and does not recommend that the member states establish
laws punishing those who use illicit payments. 1
39
The primary distinction between the OECD Code of Conduct
and the United Nations' resolution is the OECD's attempted estab-
lishment of a comprehensive set of guidelines for multinational cor-
porations operating within the OECD countries. 140  Since the
OECD members are predominately developed nations,' 4' the
guidelines generally have no application in developing countries.
D. The International Chamber of Commerce
Following the OECD Code of Conduct, the ICC adopted the
Shawcross Report in November of 1977.42 The Shawcross Report
132. Supra note 127.
133. Resolution on the Council Establishing a Committee on International Investment
and Multinational Enterprises, adopted Jan. 21, 1975, OECD Doc. C(74) 247 (1975).
134. Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, adopted
June 21, 1976, Annex and Decisions of Council, OECD Doc. 21 (76) 04/1 (1976), 75 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 83 (1976), reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 967 (1976) [hereinafter cited as







140. AD Hoc COMM. REPORT, supra note 87, at 37-38.
141. See note 9 supra.
142. Extortion and Bribery in Business Transaction, The Shawcross Report adopted by
13 1st Sess. of the Council of the ICC, 29 November 1977, ICC Doc. No. 192/36 (March 14,
15
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resulted from an investigation conducted by an ad hoc Commission
on Ethical Practices by the ICC.
14 3
The Shawcross Report declared, after examining payment
transactions, that illicit payments are given and taken on a recipro-
cal basis rather than "initiated by enterprise.""' Consequently, it
recommended that both government and the business community
endeavor to eliminate the use of illicit payments. i45 To accomplish
this the Shawcross Report urged governments to enact legislation
prohibiting "all aspects of both the giving and taking of bribes, in-
cluding promises and solicitations of bribes, as well as so-called fa-
cilitating payments."'
146
The ICC was the first international organization to explicitly
state which types of illicit payments were prohibited.' 47 According
to the ICC, illicit payments included bribes, facilitating payments,
promises of bribes and extortion payments. 148 Furthermore, the
Report recommended that both the payor and the receiver of an
illicit payment be punished.
149
The ICC subsequently adopted the Rules of Conduct to Com-
bat Extortion and Bribery on June 20, 1978.15° The Rules of Con-
duct were directed toward multinational corporations, rather than
governments,'' a distinction which the ICC found material.
The Rules of Conduct are voluntary, 5 2 and they are designed
to promote and protect "high standards of integrity in business
transactions."' 15 3 Contrary to the Shawcross Report, the Rules of
Conduct do not provide guidance regarding facilitating pay-
1977), reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 686 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Shawcross
Report].
143. Id.
144. The Shawcross Report concluded that "[njeither governments nor business can
alone deal effectively with this problem. Therefore, complementary and mutually reinforc-






150. Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery, ICC Pub. No. 315, reprinted in
17 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 417 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Rules of Conduct].
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. The introduction to the Rules of Conduct states, '... [Plromot[ion of) high
standards of integrity in business transactions. . . also form a valuable defensive protection
to those enterprises which are subjected to attempts at extortion."
Vol. I11
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ments. 154 The effect of the Rules of Conduct is not to support
criminalization of illicit payments, but rather to assist multinational
corporations in business transactions.' 55
E U.N. Draft Text
The preceding analysis of U.N., OAS, OECD and ICC action
demonstrates the lack of effective international steps toward elimi-
nating illicit payments. This is partly because the guidelines, codes
of conduct, and resolutions depend upon voluntary compliance by
multinational corporations rather than mandatory proscription of
illicit payments. A major shortcoming can also be found in the var-
ious definitions of illicit payments. Without a clear definition there
can not be effective enforcement of the prohibition of illicit pay-
ments. Nevertheless, the comprehensive condemnation of illicit
payments from the international community suggests a prevailing
attitude against certain practices by multinational corporations.
The International Agreement on Illicit Payments (Draft
Text) "'56 rectifies the faults of the previous international attempts.
Unlike the OECD, the ICC, and the OAS, whose members repre-
sent distinct economic interests, the Committee members of the
Draft Text represent every geographical region. 15 7 Furthermore,
the Draft Text would be legally binding on all signatories. 58
The Draft Text is indicative of the International community's
conception of the scope and definition of illicit payments. It states:
Each contracting state undertakes to make the following acts
punishable by appropriate criminal penalties under it's national
law:
a. The offering, promising or giving of any payment, gift or
other advantage by any natural person, on his own behalf or
on behalf of any enterprise or any other person whether judi-
cial or natural to or for the benefit of a public official as un-
154. Id. Cf. The Shawcross Report, supra note 142 which states governments should
prohibit "'all aspects of... bribes, . . . as well as so-called facilitating payments."
155. Rules of Conduct, supra note 150, at 419.
156. Draft Text, supra note Ii.
157. Member countries of the Committee include: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Central African Empire, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, France,
Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali,
Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian
Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom, North Ire-
land, United Republic of Cameroon, the United States, and Venezuela.
158. Draft Text, supra note 11, at 1026, 1027.
17
Hamilton: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: A Solution or a Proble
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1981
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
due consideration for performance of his duties in
connection with an international commercial transaction.
b. The soliciting, demanding, accepting or receiving, directly or
indirectly, by a public official of any payment, gift or other
advantage, as undue consideration for performing or re-
fraining from the performance of his duties in connection
with an international commercial transaction. 159
The Draft Text prohibits bribes, kickbacks, facilitating, and
extortion payments by both the payor and receiver whereas politi-
cal contributions are not prohibited. Approval of the Draft Text
would bind the signatories 160 to act to prohibit bribes, kickbacks,
facilitating, and extortion payments.
Should the United States ratify the treaty, some of its provi-
sions would conflict with the criminal provisions of the FCPA. The
most contradictory clause in the Draft Text is the prohibition of
illicit payments to any "employee of a Government or of a public
or governmental authority or agency who otherwise performs a
public function."' 6 1 Thus, while the FCPA exempts "clerks whose
duties are essentially ministerial,"' 6 2 the Draft Text imposes liabil-
ity on foreign "clerks." Further, unlike the FCPA, the Draft Text
does not prohibit the payment of political contributions to public
officials.' 6 3 In the event that the United States does ratify the
treaty, the FCPA would be superseded, and facilitating payments
would be excluded while political contributions would be permit-
ted.
IV. FOREIGN CRIMINAL CODES
International law is not limited to the works of international
organizations. Rather, international law is composed of fundamen-
tal rights and duties binding nations, derived from express treaty
provisions, customary practice, and general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations.' 64 Thus, a complete analysis of the pro-
hibition of illicit payments must also include an examination of the
customary practice of States.
159. Id.
160. Id. Article I states: "Each contracting State undertakes to make the following acts
punishable by appropriate criminal penalties under its national law."
161. Draft Text, supra note 11, at 1027.
162. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b)(2) (West Supp. 1980).
163. Cf. Id. §§ 78dd-I(a)-2(a) with the Draft Text, supra note 11.
164. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (1966).
Vol. I I
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A uniform practice by States creates a custom, 165 the evidence
of which may often be found in State legislation.' 66 It is through
this incorporation of custom into legislation that States can express
their preferences as to which types of conduct will or will not be
tolerated. 67 Legislation also acts to establish the rights and duties
of each state to punish those individuals whose conduct is consid-
ered unacceptable.
68
The following examination of a number of criminal codes
from both developed and developing states suggests that certain
kinds of illicit payments are universally prohibited.
A. Introduction
Since 1806 States have enacted criminal statutes prohibiting
illicit payments.169 Prior to the passage of the FCPA many States
had enacted such statutes. 7 ° These enactments suggest a long-
standing practice of States prohibiting illicit payments.
The following criminal codes are representative of States with
differing social, economic and political positions. An attempt was
made to study only those States which did not participate in the
U.N. Draft Text.
B. Liability of Persons
In order to fall within the purview of the statutes of both devel-
oped and developing states, the receiver of an illicit payment must
be a public official. The developing States of Bolivia,'
165. Id.
166. In the Serbian Loans case 11929] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 14 the World Court stated that
"the [municipal] rules thereof may be common to several States and may even be established
by international conventions or customs, and in the latter case may possess the character of
true international law governing the relations between States."
167. See generally W.M. REISMAN, supra note 16, at 69-93.
168. Id.
169. Senate Report, supra note 44, at 6. See also Foreign Bribes, supra note 117, at 235
n.26 (1977) for a list of the penalties imposed in various countries for illicit payments.
170. John J. McCloy, Chairman of the Gulf Oil Special Review Committee investigating
questionable payments, stated that the Committee "could not identify a single country where
a bribe of a government official to induce a government to enter into a contract with any
company for the supply of its product to that government was not illegal in that country."
Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings on S 3133 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976).
171. THE PENAL CODES OF BOLIVIA, Book 2, tit. 2, ch. I, art. 147, reprinted in Y. KUGEL
& N.P. COHEN, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF BUSINESS ETHICS BOOK II § 2.3 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Y. KUGEL & N.P. COHEN, REGULATION OF BUSINESS].
19
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the People's Republic of China,'72 Columbia,'73 El Salvador, 174
Ghana, 175  India, 7 6  Jordan, 177  Paraguay,
7 1 Saudi Arabia, 79
Senegal, 180 Tanzania,'' Thailand, 1 82 Zaire, 183 and Zambia, 8 4 all
punish public officials or public employees for accepting illicit
payments. Similarly, such developed States as France,8 5 the
Federal Republic of Germany, 8 6 The Netherlands,1
8 7 Sweden,188
Switzerland,"8 9 and the United Kingdom' 90 also prohibit public of-
172. STATUTE ON PENALTIES FOR CORRUPTION IN THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC,
April 21, 1952, art. 7, reprinted in Y. KUGEL & N.P. COHEN, REGULATION OF BUSINESS,
supra note 171, at § 3.1.
173. THE PENAL CODE OF COLUMBIA, Book 2, tit. 3, ch. 3, art. 160, reprinted in Y. Ku-
GEL & N.P. COHEN, REGULATION OF BUSINESS, supra note 171, at § 2.7.
174. THE PENAL CODE OF EL SALVADOR, March 30, 1973, art. 444, reprinted in Y. Ku-
GEL & N.P. COHEN, REGULATION OF BUSINESS, supra note 171, at § 2.11.
175. ACTS OF GHANA, CRIMINAL CODE OF 1960, art. 240, reprintedin Y. KUGEL & N.P.
COHEN, REGULATION OF BUSINESS, supra note 171, at § 1.5.
176. INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860, No. 45, 161, reprinted in Y. KUGEL & N.P. COHEN,
REGULATION OF BUSINESS, supra note 171, at § 3.4.
177. CRIMINAL CODE OF JORDAN, Crimes Against Official Duties, 1960, No. 16, art. 170,
reprinted in Y. KUGEL & N.P. COHEN, REGULATION OF BUSINESS, supra note 171, at § 3.9.
178. CRIMINAL CODE OF PARAGUAY, Book 2, ch. 3, art. 168, reprinted in Y. KUGEL &
N.P. COHEN, REGULATION OF BUSINESS, supra note 171, at § 2.17.
179. Regulations for Combatting Bribery, Royal Decree No. 38, 22 SHAWWARD 1377
(May 11, 1958), reprinted in Y. KUGEL & N.P. COHEN, REGULATION OF BUSINESS, supra
note 171, at § 3.14.
180. PENAL CODE AND CODE OF VIOLATIONS, Bribery of Public Officials and Employees,
1972, art. 159, reprinted in Y. KUGEL & N.P. COHEN, REGULATION OF BUSINESS, supra note
171, at § 1.8.
181. PENAL CODE OF TANZANIA, 1945, Div. 1I, ch. X, art. 91, reprinted in Y. KUGEL &
N.P. COHEN, REGULATION OF BUSINESS, supra note 171, at § 1.10.
182. THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THAILAND, 1956, Act of Offences of Employees of State
Organizations or Working Units, art. 4, reprinted in Y. KUGEL & N.P. COHEN, REGULATION
OF BUSINESS, supra note 171, at § 3.16.
183. CRIMINAL CODE OF ZAIRE, 1960, Bribery of Public Officials and Court-Appointed
Arbitrators and Experts, art. 147, reprinted in Y. KUGEL & N.P. COHEN, REGULATION OF
BUSINESS, supra note 171, at § 1.12.
184. PENAL CODE OF ZAMBIA, 1931, art. 147, reprinted in Y. KUGEL & N.P. COHEN,
REGULATION OF BUSINESS, supra note 171, at § 1.13.
185. FRENCH-PENAL LAW, § 4, art. 177, reprintedin Y. KUGEL & N.P. COHEN, REGULA-
TION OF BUSINESS, supra note 171, at § 5.3.
186. CRIMINAL CODE OF GERMANY, tit. 8, Crimes Against the Public Service, § 460, re-
printedin Y. KUGEL & N.P. COHEN, REGULATION OF BUSINESS, supra note 171, at § 5.4.
187. THE NETHERLANDS PENAL CODE, art. 362, reprinted in Y. KUGEL & N.P. COHEN,
REGULATION OF BUSINESS, supra note 171, at § 5.9.
188. PENAL CODE OF SWEDEN, ch. 20, § 2, reprinted in Y. KUGEL & N.P. COHEN, REGU-
LATION OF BUSINESS, supra note 171, at § 5.15.
189. PENAL CODE OF SWITZERLAND, art. 316, reprinted in Y. KUGEL & N.P. COHEN,
REGULATION OF BUSINESS, supra note 171, at § 5.16.
190. PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1906, reprinted in Y. KUGEL & N.P. COHEN,
REGULATION OF BUSINESS, supra note 171, at § 5.17.
20
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ficials from accepting or agreeing to accept illicit payments. The
difference between the developed and the developing States is that
the criminal statutes of the developed States prohibit illicit pay-
ments to individuals who are not public officials.
In the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1906 the United
Kingdom extended the criminal prohibition of illicit payments to
include agents in business transactions.' 91 The Criminal Codes of
Sweden prohibit any person from offering or accepting illicit pay-
ments, 192 while the Penal Code of The Netherlands prohibits busi-
nessmen from accepting illicit payments. 193 The United States
initially recognized that payments made to public officials should
be prohibited,'94 however, this position was changed by the FCPA,
which exempts those officials "whose duties are essentially ministe-
rial or clerical."'195
B. Kinds of Illegal Payments
1. Bribes. All of the statutes examined prohibited bribes.
196
Some statutes, including those of Saudi Arabia,'97 India,' 98
Thailand,' 99 Columbia,2° Sweden,2°' the United Kingdom,20 2
France,20 3 Senegal,2°4 Tanzania, 2°5  the People's Republic of
China,20 6 and Zambia,20 7 expressly prohibit bribes to public offi-
cials where a transaction is pending or likely to be pending before
191. Id.
192. PENAL CODE, ch. 9, §§ 1-12, supra note 188.
193. THE NETHERLANDS PENAL CODE, art. 328, supra note 187.
194. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78q(b), 78dd, 78ff (West Supp. 1980).
195. Id.
196. The essential requirements for a bribe are that the receiver must be a public official
and the payment must influence his actions.
197. Regulations for Combatting Bribery, supra note 179.
198. INDIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 176.
199. THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THAILAND, supra note 182.
200. THE PENAL CODE OF COLUMBIA, supra note 173.
201. PENAL CODE OF SWEDEN, supra note 188.
202. PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, supra note 190.
203. FRENCH PENAL LAW, supra note 185.
204. PENAL CODE AND CODE VIOLATIONS, supra note 180.
205. PENAL CODE OF TANZANIA, supra note 181.
206. STATUTE ON PENALTIES FOR CORRUPTION IN THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC,
supra note 172.
207. PENAL CODE OF ZAMBIA, supra note 184.
21
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the public official. The statutes of Bolivia,20 8 El Salvador, 20 9
Ghana,2 1 ° Jordan,2 ' Paraguay,212 Zaire,
213 The Netherlands, 2 4
and Switzerland2"5 refer generally to the prohibition of bribes to
public officials and employees.
2. Extortion Payments. Of the developing states216 only
Saudi Arabia,217 Ghana,2"' Senegal, 219 Zaire, 220 and the People's
Republic of China22' prohibit threats or acts of violence to procure
payments from individuals. In contrast, all the developed states
prohibit extortion payments.222 Where the extortion is considered
especially corrupt, some statutes provide for a separate crime of ag-
gravated extortion.223 Due to the limited number of states which
expressly prohibit extortion, there is no universal consensus for the
proscription of extortion payments to public officials.
3. Facilitating Payments. Of the developing states, 224 Colum-
bia,225 Ghana, 226 India, 227 Senegal, 228 and Thailand 229 combine
facilitating payments-and bribes into a single sentence. Senegal's
law illustrates the combination of facilitating payments and bribes:
Whoever being an official... demands or agrees to accept
for himself or for others, any property or benefits for doing or
not doing anything in connection with his exercise of his func-
208. THE PENAL CODES OF BOLIVIA, supra note 171.
209. THE PENAL CODE OF EL SALVADOR, supra note 174.
210. ACTS OF GHANA, supra note 175.
211. CRIMINAL CODE OF JORDAN, supra note 177.
212. CRIMINAL CODE OF PARAGUAY, supra note 178.
213. CRIMINAL CODE OF ZAIRE, supra note 183.
214. THE NETHERLANDS PENAL CODE, supra note 187.
215. PENAL CODE OF SWITZERLAND, supra note 189.
216. An extortion requires a threat from to receiver to procure payments or benefits from
the receiver.
217. Regulations for Combatting Bribery, supra note 179.
218. AcTs OF GHANA, supra note 175.
219. PENAL CODE AND CODE VIOLATIONS, supra note 180.
220. CRIMINAL CODE OF ZAIRE, supra note 183.
221. STATUTE ON PENALTIES FOR CORRUPTION, supra note 172.
222. See notes 185-210 supra.
223. CRIMINAL CODE OF GERMANY, sec. 259, supra note 186.
224. A facilitating payment consists of a public official accepting a payment for perform-
ing his duties.
225. THE COLUMBIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 173.
226. AcTS OF GHANA, supra note 175.
227. INDIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 176.
228. PENAL CODE AND CODE VIOLATIONS, supra note 180.
229. THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THAILAND, supra note 182.
Vol. I1I
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tions, shall be punished.2 3 °
A preponderance of developing states, including Bolivia,2 3 El
Salvador,23 2 Jordan,2 33 Paraguay,3 the People's Republic of
China,23" Tanzania,2 36 Zaire,23 7 Saudi Arabia,23 8 and Zambia,23 9
prohibit facilitating payments. What is unique about these coun-
tries is that their statutes provide separate articles and penalties for
facilitating payments.
Similarly, the developed states of France,2 40 the Federal Re-
public of Germany,2 4 I The Netherlands,24 2 Sweden,2 43 Switzer-
land,244 and the United Kingdom2 45 prohibit facilitating payments.
Switzerland's statute is illustrative:
Public officials... who, in order to do an act not contrary
to their duties and within the scope of their employment who
solicit, accept or have promised to accept a donation or other
benefit, to which he was not entitled, will be punished.24 6
4. Political Contributions and Kickbacks. Political contribu-
tions, in sharp contrast to bribes and facilitating payments, are ac-
cepted and encouraged in many countries.24 7 Some developed
countries, such as Canada 24 and the United Kingdom,24 9 allow po-
litical contributions without disclosure, while others, such as
Germany,2 50 provide tax deductions for such contributions.
Illegal kickbacks involve a secret return of a part of the sum
230. PENAL CODE AND CODE VIOLATIONS, supra note 180.
231. THE PENAL CODES OF BOLIVIA, supra note 171.
232. PENAL CODE OF EL SALVADOR, supra note 174, art. 445.
233. CRIMINAL CODE OF JORDAN, supra note 177, art. 171(1).
234. PENAL CODE OF PARAGUAY, supra note 178, art. 168.
235. STATUTES ON PENALTIES FOR CORRUPTION IN THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC,
supra note 172, art. 7.
236. THE PENAL CODE OF TANZANIA, supra note 181, art. 92.
237. CRIMINAL CODE OF ZAIRE, supra note 183, art. 147.
238. Regulations for Combatting Bribery, supra note 179, art. 1.
239. PENAL CODE OF ZAMBIA, supra note 184, art. 95.
240. THE FRENCH PENAL LAW, supra note 185.
241. CRIMINAL CODE OF GERMANY, supra note 186.
242. THE NETHERLANDS PENAL CODE, supra note 187.
243. PENAL CODE OF SWEDEN, supra note 188.
244. PENAL CODE OF SWITZERLAND, supra note 189.
245. PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT OF 1906, supra note 190.
246. PENAL CODE OF SWITZERLAND, supra note 189.
247. Senate Hearings on Political Contributions, supra note 26, at 5-6.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Wall Street Journal, Mar. 18, 1976, at 28, col. 2 (Eastern ed.).
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received in a business transaction. India,25 ' Thailand, 252
Columbia,25 3 Senegal,254 Tanzania, 255 and Zambia 256 prohibit
monies paid to public officials during, before, or after a transaction.
One such statute, the India Penal Code, provides:
165. Whoever, being a public servant, accepts or obtains,
or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain, for himself, or for any
other person, any valuable thing without consideration, or for a
consideration which he knows to be inadequate, from any person
whom he knows to have been, or to be, or to be likely to be
concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to
be transacted by such public servant, or having any connection
with the official functions of himself or of any public servant to
whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows to
be interested in or related to the person so concerned shall be
punished.257
5. Conclusion. Foreign criminal codes provide a basis for de-
termining whether certain kinds of illicit payments are consistently
prohibited. The precding analysis shows that bribes and facilitat-
ing payments are prohibited world-wide. In contrast, kickbacks are
occasionally prohibited by developing and developed states, while
extortion is prohibited by all developed countries and only by a few
developing countries. The prohibition of political contributions ap-
pears to be a unique proscription by the United States.
Comparing the above with the United Nations Draft Text and
the FCPA, it is evident that the Draft Text and the foreign criminal
codes universally prohibit bribes and facilitating payments to pub-
lic officials while there is not a world-wide consensus that kick-
backs, political contributions and extortions should be prohibited.
The refusal by the United States to prohibit facilitating pay-
ments contradicts the universal prohibition of such payments. Fur-
thermore, the United States proscription of political contributions
is at odds with the criminal statutes of both developing and devel-
oped states.
251. INDIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 176.
252. CRIMINAL CODE OF THAILAND, supra note 182.
253. PENAL CODE OF COLUMBIA, supra note 173.
254. PENAL CODE AND CODE VIOLATIONS, supra note 180.
255. PENAL CODE OF TANZANIA, supra note 181.
256. PENAL CODE OF ZAMBIA, supra note 184.
257. INDIAN PENAL CODE, supra note 176.
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V. UNFAIR EFFECTS OF THE FCPA
Criminal penalties under the FCPA occur when an illicit pay-
ment is made in a foreign country or to a foreign official. 258 The
extraterritorial impact of the FCPA conflicts with "concepts of sov-
ereignty and the territorial supremacy of states." Where a person's
conduct is subject to inconsistent proscriptions, the Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Laws requires the United States to
take into account the laws of other States.259 The United States'
refusal to take into account these laws unfairly affects certain types
of United States multinational corporations, both economically and
criminally. 260  This refusal also creates foreign relations problems
for the United States.26'
Multinational corporations use illicit payments to obtain eco-
nomic gains.262 The corporation, depending upon the particular
business, may use various types of illicit payments to achieve eco-
nomic advantages. 263 Thus, the FCPA directly affects the business
of multinational corporations.264
There are four major classifications of American multinational
corporations 265 - the aircraft, oil, drug and food industries.266
Each industry, due to its unique features, uses one type of illicit
payment more than others.
The aircraft industry employs foreigners as sales agents to pro-
mote their products. 267 In some instances, countries require foreign
corporations to employ local agents before the government will be-
258. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78dd-l(a)(I)-(3), 78dd-2(a)(l)-(3) (West Supp. 1980).
259. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 40 (1965) provides:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the
rules they prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each
state is required by international law to consider in good faith, moderating the exer-
cise of its enforcement jurisdiction.
260. See generally text accompanying notes 289-95 infra.
261. See Herlihy & Levine, supra note 39; J. KENNEDY & C.E. SIMON, supra note 3, at
118.
262. Id.
263. See text accompanying notes 265-93 infra.
264. J. KENNEDY & C.E. SIMON, supra note 3, at 118.
265. This is based on data compiled from the SEC's disclosure report of corporations
making illicit payments. Of the thirty-two corporations spending more than one million dol-
lars in illicit payments, half of these were the oil, aircraft, food, and drug industries. See Y.
KUGEL & G.W. GRUENBERG, supra note 5, at 45-54.
266. Id.
267. Senate Hearings on Political Contributions, supra note 26. See also TIME, February
23, 1976, at 31.
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gin negotiations. 268  By using local agents, a corporation can en-
hance it's chances of securing a sale.2 69 An additional factor
encouraging the use of foreign agents is that these corporations ex-
ist on singular billion-dollar sales.270 Foreign agents are generally
compensated by commissions, which have been up to seven million
dollars.27 1 Although the payment of commissions for agent's serv-
ices are not illegal,272 suspicion is aroused when payments are sub-
stantial, the agent is employed by the government and the agent is
instrumental in influencing the governmental entity to grant the
contract.273 Payments made under these conditions are, in reality,
bribes because the commission does not compensate the agent for
his promotion of the product, but rather is made for the agent's
influence in the government. 274  Thus, the necessity of foreign
agents in aircraft sales inclines the corporation to pay bribes dis-
27-5guised as commissions.
The oil industry is primarily concerned with maintaining a
profitable environment within the host country.2 76 This concern is
caused by the corporation's investment in substantial amounts of
fixed capital,277 such as oil rigs, tankers and pipelines.278 It follows
that one of the fundamental inquiries of multinational corporations
before investing large amounts of capital is the degree of "political
risk" in a country.279
Oil corporations have supported political systems with contri-
butions, particularly where they are legal and acceptable. 280 Where
the political conditions were unfavorable, 281 some corporations
have attempted to upset the existing government with political con-
268. Hearings on Activities of American Corporations, supra note 2, at 100.
269. Senate Hearings on Political Contributions, supra note 26, at 115.
270. Herlihy & Levine, supra note 39, at 561.
271. Wall Street Journal, January 4, 1979, at 2, col. 2.
272. See generally The FCRA, supra note 95.
273. Solomon & Linville, Corporate Foreign Payments, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REV.
303, 307 (1976).
274. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
275. Solomon & Linville, supra note 273, at 307-09. The authors explain that "corpora-
tions often pay their consultants on a no-questions-asked basis, preferring not to know how
the agents operate."
276. Y. KUGEL & G. GRUENBERG, supra note 5, at 78.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. K. HOSSAIN, LAW AND POLICY IN PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT: CHANGING RELA-
TIONS BETWEEN TRANSNATIONALS AND GOVERNMENTS 36 (1979).
280. A. PINELO, supra note 42.
281. Solomon & Linville, supra note 273, at 309.
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tributions. An additional pressure for political contributions occurs
when the "balance of power" between the corporation and the host
country shifts over time.282 While the corporation may, at first, ex-
ert considerable influence over the political climate, the increased
knowledge and confidence of the developing country may "shift the
balance of power firmly away from the multinational corpora-
tion." '283 To counter this shift, the corporation often contributes to
favorable political parties whether or not they are in power.284
The food and drug industries are primarily concerned with im-
port and export duties and customs inspection. 2 5 Contractual obli-
gations necessitate smooth and swift transactions among
governmental employees.286 Furthermore, the food industry has a
peculiar need to clear products through customs because spoiled
goods are worthless. 287 This dependence upon the speed and ac-
ceptance of goods encourages the use of facilitating payments to
governmental officials.288
It is apparent that the aircraft and oil industries are unfairly
affected by the FCPA. These industries, which typically use politi-
cal contributions and bribes as a means of promoting their business
goals, are penalized for business practices which are, by necessity,
fundamental to their existence. Conversely, the food and drug in-
dustries, which characteristically resort to facilitating payments, re-
main relatively untouched by the FCPA. This can be seen in a
number of ways. Statistics reveal that numerous multinational cor-
porations have authorized facilitating payments. 28 9 Predictably,
the list does not include multinational oil and aircraft corpora-
tions.29° In criminal proceedings brought by the SEC alleging the
use of illegal payments, no food and drug corporations were in-
volved, only oil and aircraft industries. 29 1 A recent complaint filed
282. Vagts, Coercion and Foreign Investment Rearrangements, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 17, 21
(1978).
283. Id.
284. A. PINELO, supra note 42.
285. Y. KUGEL & G. GRUENBERG, supra note 5, at 80.
286. S. Res. 265, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 16, 735 (1975). See also Wall
Street Journal, May 9, 1975, at 1.
287. Y. KUGEL & G. GRUENBERG, supra note 5, at 80.
288. Id.
289. J. KENNEDY & C.E. SIMON, supra note 3, at 385.
290. Id.
291. See, e.g., SEC v. McDonnel-Douglas Corp., 484 SEC Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) (A-6
D.D.C. Dec. 14, 1978); SEC v. Katy Indus. Inc., 469 SEC Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) (A-I N.D.
III. Aug. 30, 1978); SEC v. Page Airways Inc., (1978) Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH II 96, 393 D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1978).
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pursuant to section 104 of the FCPA accused the President and
Vice-President of Holcar Oil Company of bribing foreign offi-
cials. 292 Similarly, the majority of Bi-lateral Payoff Cooperation
Agreements made between the United States and foreign govern-
ments to penalize the making of illicits payments pertain to oil and
aircraft multinational corporations. 93
The potential economic effects of the FCPA upon American
multinational corporations has been widely debated. One author
contends that the "potential trade losses would be small, if not in-
significant. ' 29 4 However, a recent White House Task Force on Ex-
port Impediments estimated one billion dollars of foreign business
had been lost so far due to the FCPA.295
Essentially there are two alternatives available to the United
States to reciify the legal inconsistencies caused by the FCPA. The
first would incorporate the international customary attitude into the
FCPA. This would entail revising the FCPA to include facilitating
payments. By deleting the phrase "such term does not include any
employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or
instrumentality thereof whose duties are essentially ministerial or
clerical" the FCPA would include facilitating payments. The sec-
ond alternative would encourage the acceptance of an international
agreement on illicit payments which incorporates customary inter-
national law. Assuming the United States ratifies the agreement, it
would supersede the FCPA. An international approach would
have the added effect of equalizing the burden of guilt by prosecut-
ing not only corporations for making payments, but receivers as
well. This would create a stronger deterrent since both parties
would be punished. Finally, the problems currently faced by the
United States under the FCPA, such as lack of evidence and wit-
nesses, and the conflicts of the exercise of jurisdiction over the pun-
ishment of illicit payments, would be resolved under the agreement.
292. See United States v. Carver, reprinted in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE TRANSNA-
TIONAL CORPORATE CONDUCT, supra note I, at 363.
293. See, e.g., Federal Republic of Germany, entered into force Sept. 24, 1976; Italy,
signed March 23, 1976; The Netherlands, signed Mar. 29, 1976; Belgium, signed May 31,
1976; Canada, signed Mar. 1977; Columbia, signed Apr. 22, 1976; Greece, signed May 20,
1976; Mexico, signed June, 1976; Nigeria, signed Apr. 20, 1976; Spain, signed July 14, 1976;
Turkey, signed July 8, 1976.
294. Lashbrooke, supra note 13, at 246.
295. See Wall Street Journal, September 21, 1979, at 12, col. I. See also Wall Street
Journal, September 8, 1978, at i, col. 5.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The FCPA does not adequately deal with the problem of illicit
payments. The FCPA's vague language, the exemption of facilitat-
ing payments and the extraterritorial application of the Act have
stifled many United States multinational corporations. As a result,
approximately one billion dollars has been lost by multinational
corporations in foreign business. Furthermore, the food and drug
corporations which rely on facilitating payments remain un-
touched, while the oil and aircraft corporations which use bribes
and political contributions in business transactions are subject to
increased criminal liability.
In light of these problems, a unified consistent solution is
needed. International organizations have not been able to find the
answer. The OECD's Code of Conduct and the ICC's Rules of
Conduct both fail to clearly define prohibited payments, and do not
provide criminal penalties for those who violate the guidelines. Al-
though the Draft Text rectifies these faults, it has not yet been rati-
fied.
The important aspect emerging from the Draft Text is that it
prohibits facilitating payments. Similarly, an examination of for-
eign criminal codes shows that facilitating payments are customa-
rily prohibited. Since the United States is willing to take the first
step toward solving this problem, it should recognize and incorpo-
rate customary international law into domestic legislation. By re-
vising the FCPA to include facilitating payments, or encouraging
an international agreement, much can be done towards providing a
uniform and impartial system for dealing with illicit payments.
Jefferi Joan Hamilton
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